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AFFILIATIVE DISCRIMINATION THEORY: TITLE 
VII LITIGATION WITHIN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Pierce G. Hand, IV 
INTRODUCTION 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reached a groundbreaking decision by reversing the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit and holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to license and recognize a marriage between two 
people of the same sex.1 In reaching this holding, the Court took note 
of society’s changing perspective and remarked that “changed 
understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new 
dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations[.]”2 The 
Court further explained, “new insights and societal understandings 
can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental 
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”3 As 
proponents of same-sex marriage celebrate a victory for equal 
marriage rights, employment practitioners advise that the current 
cultural shift that led to Obergefell “likely signals the arrival of a 
change in employment law” where sexual orientation discrimination 
has not been recognized as unlawful.4 A review of the Sixth Circuit’s 
precedent regarding sexual orientation discrimination within the 
workplace forecasts, in agreement with practitioners, employment 
discrimination as the next successful battleground for proponents of 
lesbian and gay rights. 
                                                                                                                 
  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my 
mother, Lisa Y. Warner, and my partner, Scot R. Seitz, for their continuous love, support, and 
encouragement throughout the drafting and publication of this work. I would also like to thank 
Professors Lauren S. Lucas and Tanya M. Washington for their thoughtful input and inspiration. 
 1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2596. 
 3. Id. at 2603. 
 4. David Wachtel & Karen Tanenbaum, STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES—Obergefell v. Hodges and 
the Future of LGBT Rights in the Workplace, WOLTERS KLUWER EMP. L. DAILY (CCH), July 14, 2015, 
2015 WL 4233773. 
1
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Meet Fred Tetro, a Caucasian male and finance manager at a car 
dealership.5 After Tetro’s boss, the dealership owner, discovered 
Tetro had a biracial daughter, he began ridiculing and insulting Tetro 
on different occasions in front of employees and customers.6 Tetro 
overheard the owner on a telephone call discussing how he never 
knew Tetro had a biracial child and how this fact would hurt his 
dealership and image in the community.7 
Now, meet Christopher Vickers, a police officer for a medical 
center who befriended a male doctor and a younger male employee at 
the medical center.8 Since Vickers developed these platonic 
friendships, two coworkers began making homophobic remarks and 
alleging that Vickers was gay.9 After learning that Vickers also 
vacationed with a former male roommate, his coworkers increased 
the frequency and severity of their harassment: tampering with 
Vickers’s firearm, putting his life in danger during an arrest,10 
constantly referring to him as “fag,” and at times “humping” his 
buttocks to suggest he would enjoy anal sex.11 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 990 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
 6. Id. Upon Tetro’s biracial daughter visiting him at the car dealership, Tetro’s coworker noticed 
the dealership owner roll his eyes in a derogatory manner and immediately walk away. Id. Instead of 
aiming insults at his biracial daughter, however, the boss ridiculed and insulted Tetro mainly about his 
weight. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating Vickers befriended a 
homosexual doctor whom Vickers assisted in an investigation regarding sexual misconduct); Complaint 
at 16, Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-858, 2006 WL 5549247 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2006) 
(No. C2-03-858) (stating in August of 2002, Vickers befriended a 17-year-old male employee, named 
Josh, who aspired to become a police officer and that coworkers referred to Josh as Vickers’s 
boyfriend). 
 9. Complaint, supra note 8, at 15. 
 10. Complaint, supra note 8, at 15–17. Vickers alleged that during an arrest, he discovered his 
coworkers had previously “double-locked” his handcuffs, requiring a key and two free hands to unlock. 
Id. at 17. Vickers had to temporarily take both his hands off the arrestee, which is dangerous during the 
apprehension of an arrestee. Id. 
 11. Complaint, supra note 8, at 18–20. Alleging almost a year of daily harassment, Vickers claimed 
the harassment included the following: 
impressing the word “FAG” on the second page of Vickers’ report forms, 
frequent derogatory comments regarding Vickers’ sexual preferences and 
activities, frequently calling Vickers a “fag,” “gay,” and other derogatory names, 
playing tape-recorded conversations in the office during which Vickers was 
ridiculed for being homosexual, subjecting Vickers to vulgar gestures, placing 
irritants and chemicals in Vickers’ food and other personal property, using the 
2
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What is the difference between Tetro and Vickers? In the Sixth 
Circuit, Tetro can sue for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), while Vickers cannot.12 Title VII 
prohibits discrimination against employees because of “such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”13 In the 
Sixth Circuit, an employee can sue for discrimination under Title VII 
when he faces a hostile work environment because he affiliates with 
someone of a certain race—for example, having a biracial daughter—
while an employee cannot sue for discrimination when he faces a 
hostile work environment because he affiliates with someone of a 
certain sex—for example, having close relationships with other male 
employees within the workplace.14 The Sixth Circuit held that Tetro 
was discriminated against based on his race, even though the “root 
animus” for the discrimination was prejudice against his biracial 
child.15 Here, the Sixth Circuit joins other courts16 in adopting 
                                                                                                                 
nickname “Kiss” for Vickers, and making lewd remarks suggesting that Vickers 
provide them with sexual favors. 
Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759. Vickers also asserted that one of his coworker officers, during handcuff 
training, handcuffed Vickers and then simulated sex with him while another coworker photographed the 
incident. Id. This photograph was then faxed by one of the officers’ wives to the medical center’s 
registration center and hung up in the center’s window where several officers, staff, and visitors saw it. 
Id. at 759–60. Other complaints alleged two coworkers repeatedly touched his crotch with a tape 
measure, grabbed his chest while making derogatory comments, and tried to shove a feminine sanitary 
napkin in Vickers’s face. Id. at 760. 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 13. Id. (making it unlawful for any employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . .”). 
 14. See Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 
995 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Tetro has stated a claim under Title VII upon which relief can be granted.”); 
Vickers, 453 F.3d at 766 (“Vickers has failed to plead a hostile work environment claim.”). 
 15. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994. The court reasoned: 
If he had been African–American, presumably the dealership would not have 
discriminated because his daughter would also have been African–American. Or, 
if his daughter had been Caucasian, the dealership would not have discriminated 
because Tetro himself is Caucasian. So the essence of the alleged discrimination 
in the present case is the contrast in races between Tetro and his daughter. 
Id. at 994–95. 
 16. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2009). The Barrett court held 
that a reasonable jury could find a Caucasian employee of a Tennessee appliance manufacturing facility 
stated a claim under Title VII for race discrimination for harassment due to her friendship with black 
employees: “she received a threat of physical violence for reporting racist language, she was subjected 
to a regular stream of offensive comments about her relationship with an African-American coworker, 
3
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“affiliative discrimination theory”17—the idea that a person facing 
disparate treatment is discriminated against based on that person’s 
race when the root animus of the discrimination is the race of 
someone else with whom the person affiliates.18 
However, in Vickers’s situation—where his coworkers acted 
hostile toward him because of his friendship affiliation with other 
male employees19—the Sixth Circuit refused to consider this a result 
                                                                                                                 
and the same relationship was allegedly used as a reason to prevent her from applying for improved job 
positions.” Id.; see also Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n 
some instances, harassment will be tied inextricably to an employee’s association with individuals of 
another race.” (citing Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 255 (N.D. Ind. 1985) 
(“recounting incidents in which the plaintiff, a white woman who was married to a black man, was 
subjected to anti-black racist statements from her coworkers”))); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life 
Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding failure to hire a white man as an insurance 
salesman on account of his interracial marriage violated Title VII on the basis of race discrimination 
because “where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or association, he 
alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race”). 
 17. See infra note 18. Scholarly exploration of this theory of discrimination based on affiliation is 
not unprecedented. It has been discussed using artful terms such as “relational discrimination,” 
“associative discrimination,” and “third-party associative discrimination.” Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: 
A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 209, 213 n.25, 222 (2012); Matthew Clark, 
Comment, Stating A Title VII Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal 
Theories Available After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313, 328 (2003); Mark W. 
Honeycutt II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Third-Party Associative Discrimination Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L. 
REV. 913, 913 (2001). This Note seeks to not only explore the principles of this theory, as done by the 
aforementioned scholars, but to do so by focusing specifically on two cases within the Sixth Circuit. See 
infra Part II. Focusing on two cases within the same circuit articulates the inconsistencies that result 
when a circuit court adopts affiliative discrimination theory in one context (race) but not another (sex). 
Focusing only on two cases also articulates these inconsistencies through fact-to-fact comparison on a 
smaller, more comprehendible scale. See infra Part II. This Note further suggests why the Sixth Circuit 
should adopt an affiliative discrimination theory for discrimination “because of” sex under Title VII. See 
infra Part III. Whereas the term “relational discrimination” may suggest only family relationships to the 
exclusion of voluntary social or professional associations and the term “associative discrimination” may 
connote the First Amendment right to free association, “affiliative discrimination” is used in this Note 
because it more accurately describes a voluntary connection without a strong degree of association 
necessary to apply the theory; any degree of affiliation can result in application of the theory. See infra 
note 18. 
 18. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, in embracing affiliative discrimination theory, agree that the 
degree of the association for establishing a claim under the theory is irrelevant (e.g., father/son, 
wife/husband, friends). See Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513 (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Drake 
so that “[i]f a plaintiff shows that 1) she was discriminated against at work 2) because she associated 
with members of a protected class, then the degree of the association is irrelevant”); Drake, 134 F.3d at 
884 (“[W]e do not believe that an objective ‘degree of association’ is relevant to this inquiry.”). 
 19. Vickers served in what appeared to be a mentorship role to one of the younger employees at the 
medical center that aspired to become a police officer, had a close enough friendship with his former 
roommate to vacation with him in Florida, and also formed a friendship with one of the male doctors at 
the hospital. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759; Complaint, supra note 8, at 16. “Vickers asserts that he has never 
discussed his sexuality with any of his coworkers.” Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759. 
4
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of Vickers’s sex, but rather because of his perceived homosexual 
sexual orientation—a type of discrimination that Congress did not 
intend to protect according to the Sixth Circuit.20 However, the Sixth 
Circuit’s aim, to avoid “bootstrap[ping] protection for sexual 
orientation into Title VII” by not adopting affiliative discrimination 
theory for sex discrimination cases,21 conflicts with their own Title 
VII race jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s decisions in two 
cases: (1) Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, where the Court interpreted 
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to include employees not 
conforming to gender roles (i.e., “sex stereotyping”);22 and (2) 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., where the Court held 
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to include “reasonably 
comparable evils” that were not the “principal evils” Congress 
intended to prohibit.23 
This Note argues that the Sixth Circuit, in order to maintain 
consistent jurisprudence within its own circuit and with the Supreme 
Court, should adopt affiliative discrimination theory under sex 
discrimination in Title VII as it has done with race discrimination.24 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (holding that because “the gender non-conforming behavior which 
Vickers claims supports his theory of sex stereotyping is not behavior observed at work or affecting his 
job performance . . . the harassment of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as harassment 
based on Vickers’s perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity”). “[A]ny 
discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex stereotyping theory if this 
claim is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms 
in their sexual practices.” Id. at 764. Although “[h]arassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no 
place in our society[, c]ongress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such 
harassment.” Id. at 764–65 (quoting Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 
2001)). 
 21. Id. at 764 (“Like other courts, we have therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim 
should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”) (quoting Dawson v. 
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 22. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 23. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Brief for Petitioner, 
Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 458826, at *6–7. The Court noted that some courts, like 
the Fifth Circuit in this case, have held that same-sex sexual harassment claims—where the aggressor 
and victim are of the same sex—are never cognizable under Title VII, while other courts maintain that 
such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is homosexual, and while still 
others suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the 
harasser’s sex, sexual orientation, or motivations. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
 24. This type of protection has also been extended to national origin. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 
221–22 (interpreting the court’s analysis in Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist. to mean that discriminatory 
employment practices based on an individual’s association with people of a particular race or national 
origin because of disapproval of such associations due to the individual’s own race or national origin are 
5
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By addressing this inconsistency, the Sixth Circuit will provide 
greater protection for sex discrimination, reinforce reliability in Title 
VII with a uniform interpretation of race and sex discrimination, and 
help victimized employees make informed decisions in calculating 
the probability of success in litigating a Title VII sex discrimination 
claim. Part I of this Note provides a historical account of the 
treatment of race and sex under Title VII.25 Part II analyzes the Sixth 
Circuit’s split from its own jurisprudence and the Supreme Court in 
adopting affiliative discrimination in Tetro v. Elliott Popham 
Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc. while rejecting this 
theory in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center.26 Part III proposes that 
the Sixth Circuit adopt affiliative discrimination theory for sex 
discrimination under Title VII in order to resolve this inconsistency, 
alleviate the difficult task of distinguishing between discrimination 
based on sex and discrimination based on sexual orientation, and 
realize the benefits and increased protection to which citizens are 
statutorily entitled.27 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Race Under Title VII’s Liberal Construction 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”28 Although Title VII’s statutory 
language explicitly states “because of such individual’s race,” the 
                                                                                                                 
prohibited under Title VII (citing Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 n.1 (D. 
Colo. 1985) (holding that “discriminatory employment practices based on an individual’s association 
with people of a particular race or national origin” are prohibited under Title VII))). 
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). The term “race” has been held to prohibit discrimination 
against white as well as black persons. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 
(1976) (“We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white 
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson 
white.”). 
6
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Eleventh Circuit, in the 1986 case of Parr v. Woodmen, was the first 
circuit court to broaden the interpretation of this phrase by adopting 
affiliative discrimination theory and including the race of another 
person with whom one affiliates.29 
In Parr, a white man claimed that an insurance company did not 
hire him as a salesman because his wife was black.30 In resolving the 
Title VII claim, the Eleventh Circuit found “irrefutable” the logic 
used in a similar case before the Southern District of New York, 
Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists: 
Manifestly, if Whitney was discharged because, as alleged, the 
defendant disapproved of a social relationship between a white 
woman and a black man, the plaintiff’s race was as much a 
factor in the decision to fire her as that of her friend. Specifying 
as she does that she was discharged because she, a white woman, 
associated with a black, her complaint falls within the statutory 
language that she was ‘[d]ischarged . . . because of [her] race.’31 
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that it was obliged to give Title 
VII a liberal construction and that it was “the duty of the courts to 
make sure that the [Title VII] Act works” and is not “hampered by a 
combination of a strict construction of the statute in a battle with 
semantics.”32 After Parr, other courts, including the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits, adopted affiliative discrimination theory for Title 
VII race claims, allowing citizens to sue for discrimination based on 
the race of persons with whom they affiliated—e.g., wives, 
daughters, friends, etc.33 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 223–24. 
 30. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 889 (11th Cir. 1986). The district 
court dismissed Parr’s action because the text of the statute proscribed discrimination against his race 
and not his wife’s race. Id. at 891. 
 31. Id. at 891–92 (quoting Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 
1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). 
 32. Id. at 892 (citing Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
 33. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding a reasonable 
jury could find a Caucasian employee of a Tennessee appliance manufacturing facility stated a claim 
under Title VII for race discrimination after being threatened with physical violence due to her 
friendship with black employees); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, 
7
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B. Sex Under Title VII 
1. The Road to Actionable Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title 
VII 
Although the central purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
to prohibit racial discrimination,34 U. S. Representative Howard W. 
Smith of Virginia, at the last-minute, led an amendment to include 
the protected category of “sex.”35 The principal argument in 
opposition to the amendment was that “sex discrimination” was 
sufficiently different from other types of discrimination and ought to 
receive separate legislative treatment; however, this argument was 
defeated.36 Courts lack a detailed legislative history available to 
interpret what is inclusive of “sex” under Title VII because this 
amendment passed at the last-minute; thus, a lack of certainty and 
uniformity exists across jurisdictions.37 In fact, because sexual 
harassment was not on the face of the statute, many courts did not 
acknowledge it as a cause of action until the Supreme Court’s 1986 
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.38 
In Meritor, a female bank employee engaged in sexual relations 
with her boss out of fear that if she resisted his propositions, she 
would lose her job.39 The Court held that this sexual harassment was 
                                                                                                                 
Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding Tetro can sue for discrimination under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he affiliates with someone of a different race—his half black 
daughter); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n some 
instances, harassment will be tied inextricably to an employee’s association with individuals of another 
race.” (citing Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 255 (N.D. Ind. 1985))); Parr, 791 F.2d at 
892 (stating a white man alleging an insurance company failed to hire him as an insurance salesman due 
to his interracial marriage violated Title VII on the basis of race discrimination because “[w]here a 
plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by 
definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race”). 
 34. Yesenia Gallegos, Note, Sexual Harassment of Female Crewmembers: Title VII’s Weaknesses in 
Protecting Women Employed in the Maritime Industry, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 455, 459 (2003) (“The 
central purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, was not to protect women from sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment but to prohibit and remedy race-based employment decisions.”). 
 35. Id. at 459. 
 36. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84 
(1964)). 
 37. Gallegos, supra note 34, at 459–60. 
 38. Id. at 460; Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. 57. 
 39. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S at 60. 
8
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a form of discrimination on the basis of sex and thus a violation of 
Title VII by creating a hostile or abusive work environment.40 The 
Court reasoned that sexual harassment that creates a hostile 
environment for members of one sex is a barrier to sexual equality in 
the workplace similar to how racial harassment acts as a barrier to 
racial equality.41 
2. The Supreme Court Focuses on the Entire Spectrum of 
Disparate Treatment: Gender Norms & Same-Sex Harassment 
In 1989, the Supreme Court acknowledged a new form of sex 
discrimination called “sex stereotyping” in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.42 In Price Waterhouse, a female partnership candidate in an 
accounting firm was denied the position because she did not walk, 
talk, or dress femininely, and did not wear make-up, wear jewelry, or 
style her hair.43 The Court held that “an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must 
not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”44 The Court reasoned that 
“assuming or insisting” that employees match the stereotype 
associated with their sex is prohibited by Title VII, for “Congress 
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”45 Price Waterhouse led 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 66. The Supreme Court also noted that “not all workplace conduct that may be described as 
‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.” 
Id. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that “‘mere utterance of an 
ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ would not affect the 
conditions of employment to sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII”)); Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating same)). “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it 
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create 
an abusive working environment.’” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 41. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. The logic was that her boss would not have subjected her to 
such propositions for sex if she was a man instead of a woman—making the workplace environment 
hostile for women and not men. See id. 
 42. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989). 
 43. Id. at 235. 
 44. Id. at 250. Throughout the Price Waterhouse opinion, the Court uses the terms “sex” and 
“gender.” See generally id. Early on, the courts defined “sex” as merely biological sex, and interpreted 
the provision to only prohibit discrimination against biological men and women (mostly women) for 
being a man or being a woman. Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After 
Macy v. Holder, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013). 
 45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
9
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to cases in which Title VII was found to prohibit discrimination 
against a male employee who walks and carries his tray like a 
woman46 or takes the last name of his female spouse because such 
actions are considered non-gender conforming.47 
Generally, sexual harassment claims where the parties are of the 
opposite sex make it easier for courts to infer that the discrimination 
was “because of” sex, since these claims typically involve explicit or 
implicit proposals of sexual activity; this made it reasonable to 
assume that those proposals would not have been made to someone 
of the same sex.48 However, courts have struggled to reach this 
inference where the parties were of the same sex and consequently 
split on the issue using different approaches.49 In 1998, less than ten 
years after Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court resolved this 
inconsistency in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. where 
a male employee of an eight-man oil crew alleged sexual harassment 
after being subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him 
by male coworkers.50 The Court found harassing conduct need not be 
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination 
on the basis of sex.51 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 47. Koren v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
 48. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 49. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (discussing inconsistencies arise from three different court approaches: 
(1) Fifth Circuit’s holding that same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII, 
(2) other courts’ holdings that such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser 
is homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual desire), and (3) other courts’ holdings that 
workplace harassment sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s sex, sexual 
orientation, or motivations (citing Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); McWilliams v. 
Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 
138 (4th Cir 1996); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988))). 
 50. Id. at 77. Over a number of weeks, Oncale alleged being “sexually assaulted, battered, touched, 
and threatened with rape by his direct supervisor, John Lyons, and a second supervisor, Danny Pippen, 
who, as a driller for Sundowner, exercised de facto control over the terms and conditions of Oncale’s 
employment.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at *4. “The third individual defendant, Brandon 
Johnson, [was] a coworker with no apparent supervisory authority . . . .” Id. 
 51. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Counsel for Oncale argued the sexual harassment aimed at Oncale 
targeted homosexuality because the harassers knew it would specifically degrade and humiliate Oncale 
as a male, as opposed to being a female subjected to such harassment. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
23, at *7. 
The record confirms that Lyons, Johnson, and Pippen said what they said and did 
what they did because Joseph Oncale was a male. They used sexual talk and 
activity to demean and humiliate him. They chose their words and conduct 
10
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress did not originally 
pass Title VII to prohibit same-sex sexual harassment, but stated that 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our 
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed.”52 The Supreme Court explicitly stated that protection 
from discrimination based on sex “must extend to sexual harassment 
of any kind that meets statutory requirements.”53 
3. A New Gender Performance Rule to Exclude Sexual Orientation 
Under Title VII 
After Price Waterhouse, scholars thought homosexual people 
would have the right to bring cases under Title VII using the sex-
stereotyping theory.54 By definition, attraction to someone of the 
same sex qualifies a homosexual person as non-conforming to gender 
norms.55 However, courts began distinguishing, with much struggle, 
between whether the harasser was acting because of the victim’s sex 
or because of the victim’s sexual orientation.56 This distinction is 
important because it showed that some courts interpreted Title VII 
not to protect sexual orientation.57 
                                                                                                                 
because Oncale was a man, knowing that such language and conduct would 
degrade him as a man. 
Id. Additionally, Oncale set out three non-exhaustive ways to establish a claim for same-sex sexual 
harassment: (1) showing the harasser is homosexual, (2) showing the harasser is motivated by general 
hostility to the presence of a gender in the workplace, or (3) showing direct comparative evidence on 
how the harasser treated both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Oncale 523 U.S. at 80–81; Shepherd v. 
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s 
decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be exhaustive rather than instructive.”). 
 52. Perkins, supra note 44, at 433. 
 53. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
 54. Perkins, supra note 44, at 429. The claim for homosexuals would be that discrimination was 
based either on the stereotype that men should only be attracted to women or women should only be 
attracted to men. Id. 
 55. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]ll homosexuals, by 
definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”). 
 56. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 478 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 57. Perkins, supra note 44, at 429, 429 n.15 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 
Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 703–07 (7th Cir. 2000); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th 
Cir. 1989); and Sarff v. Cont’l Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (S.D. Tex. 1995)). 
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In 2000, the Second Circuit in Simonton v. Runyon interpreted 
Congress’s rejection of numerous bills extending protection to 
individuals based on sexual orientation to justifiably indicate a 
“strong congressional intent” not to protect sexual orientation under 
Title VII and employed a gender performance rule to distinguish 
discrimination because of sex from discrimination because of sexual 
orientation.58 The gender performance rule required a male victim of 
same-sex sexual harassment, because of his perceived or real 
homosexuality, to behave in a stereotypically feminine manner to 
show that the harassment was based on nonconformity with male 
gender norms instead of his sexual orientation.59 
Six years later, the Sixth Circuit in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical 
Center, in order to objectively60 determine whether a harasser acted 
because of the victim’s sex or sexual orientation,61 adopted 
Simonton’s gender performance rule and required the victim to 
present evidence of gender nonconformity by appearance or behavior 
in the workplace or in a way that affected job performance.62 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Employment Nondiscrimination Act 
of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th 
Cong. (1995); and Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994)). 
We do not have sufficient allegations before us to decide Simonton’s claims 
based on stereotyping because we have no basis in the record to surmise that 
Simonton behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner and that the harassment 
he endured was, in fact, based on his non-conformity with gender norms instead 
of his sexual orientation. 
Id. at 38. See also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting Congress 
has rejected a number of proposed amendments to Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation). 
 59. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38. 
 60. Boh Bros. Constr., 731 F.3d at 478–79 (“The only objective way for courts or juries to grasp that 
a same-sex harasser is acting ‘because of’ the victim’s sex is for the victim (or the harasser) visibly not 
to conform to gender stereotype.”). 
 61. Id. at 478. 
 62. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006). Vickers did not rely directly on 
Simonton in its opinion for the gender performance rule but actually relied on Dawson v. Bumble & 
Bumble, a case in the Second Circuit stating that an individual may have a viable Title VII 
discrimination claim where the employer acted out of animus toward the employee’s “exhibition of 
behavior considered to be stereotypically inappropriate for [the employee’s] gender.” Id. at 763 (quoting 
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, Dawson’s interpretation of 
Price Waterhouse is the same as Simonton’s interpretation—”one can fail to conform to gender 
stereotypes in two ways: (1) through behavior or (2) through appearance.” Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 
(quoting Dawson, 398 F.3d at 221); Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
Part II will first analyze the conflicting reasoning of the Sixth 
Circuit’s adoption of affiliative discrimination for “race” in Tetro but 
not for “sex” in Vickers under Title VII.63 Next, Part II will examine 
the Sixth Circuit’s misapplication of the sex stereotyping theory and 
gender performance rule in Vickers to avoid protecting sexual 
orientation discrimination and avoid adopting affiliative 
discrimination theory.64 Finally, Part II will scrutinize how the Sixth 
Circuit’s refusal to adopt affiliative discrimination theory departs 
from the Supreme Court’s precedent in Oncale to apply Title VII 
protection beyond congressional intent against “reasonably 
comparable evils.”65 
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Refusal to Adopt Affiliative Discrimination 
Theory for Sex  Discrimination in Vickers Conflicts with its 
Reasoning in Tetro 
1. The Sixth Circuit’s Adoption of Whitney’s “Irrefutable” Logic 
The backbone of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Tetro stems from 
the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Whitney v. Greater New York 
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists: 
Manifestly, if Whitney was discharged because, as alleged, the 
defendant disapproved of a social relationship between a white 
woman and a black man, the plaintiff’s race was as much a 
factor in the decision to fire her as that of her friend. Specifying 
as she does that she was discharged because she, a white woman, 
associated with a black, her complaint falls within the statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See infra Part II.A. This analysis discusses the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, canons of statutory construction, 
and guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See infra Part II.A.1–2. 
 64. See infra Part II.B. 
 65. See infra Part II.C. 
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language that she was ‘[d]ischarged . . . because of [her] race.’66 
Whitney’s reasoning, considered “irrefutable” by the Eleventh 
Circuit, exemplifies the principle underlying affiliative 
discrimination theory: “[w]here a plaintiff claims discrimination 
based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by 
definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his 
race.”67 In Tetro, a Caucasian plaintiff faced adverse treatment 
because of his interracial association with his biracial daughter; thus, 
his adverse treatment was, by definition, because of his race.68 The 
Court reasoned further that if Tetro had been African-American or 
his daughter Caucasian, presumably the dealership would not have 
discriminated against him.69 
In Vickers, similar elements exist for the court to conclude that 
Vickers’s coworkers discriminated against him because of his sex.70 
Vickers faced adverse treatment from his fellow police officers 
because of his same-sex association with medical center employees 
and his former roommate; thus, his adverse treatment was, by 
definition, because of his sex. 71 If Vickers or his associates had been 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 891–92 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). 
 67. Id. at 892; see also Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1366. 
 68. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994–95 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
 69. Id. at 995 (“The net effect is that the dealership has allegedly discriminated against Tetro 
because of his race.”). 
 70. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006). While Vickers did not raise 
affiliative discrimination as a theory of sex discrimination but only raised a theory of sex stereotyping 
before the Sixth Circuit, Vickers did claim disparate treatment based on his sex under Title VII and the 
court effectively rejected affiliative discrimination theory by determining that discrimination based on 
Vickers’s perceived homosexual relationship with other males was not based on Vickers’s sex but his 
perceived sexual orientation (unlike what the court would have likely done in a Title VII race case). Id. 
(“The complaint alleged sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title 
VII . . . .”). 
 71. Id. at 759. 
Once his co-workers found out about the friendship, Vickers contends that Dixon 
and Mueller “began making sexually based slurs and discriminating remarks and 
comments about Vickers, alleging that Vickers was ‘gay’ or homosexual, and 
questioning his masculinity.” Vickers asserts that following a vacation in April 
2002 to Florida with a male friend, Dixon’s and Mueller’s harassing comments 
and behavior increased. 
Id. Vickers befriended a seventeen-year-old male employee, named Josh, who aspired to become a 
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female, certainly his coworkers would not have discriminated against 
him with daily homophobic remarks, sexual touching to exemplify 
homosexual acts, and other hostile treatment related to 
homosexuality. The “net effect,” as the Sixth Circuit phrased it in 
Tetro, is that the defendants discriminated against Vickers because of 
his sex.72 Following Whitney’s logic, if Vickers was discriminated 
against because the defendants disapproved of a social relationship 
between two males, Vickers’s sex was as much a factor in the 
decision to discriminate against him as his associate’s sex—this falls 
within Title VII’s statutory language as an actionable claim.73 
2. The Sixth Circuit’s Reliance on Canons of Statutory 
Construction & Guidance from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission 
The Sixth Circuit in Tetro also found support for applying 
affiliative discrimination to the protected category of race by relying 
on the canons of statutory construction and guidance from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).74 This same 
reasoning supports applying affiliative discrimination theory to the 
protected category of sex in Vickers. 
a. Applying the Cardinal Canon of Legislative Purpose 
In Tetro, the court found that the absence of words like “directly” 
or “indirectly” in the statute, concerning how a person may 
discriminate “because of such individual’s race,” created 
                                                                                                                 
police officer and his coworkers referred to Josh as Vickers’s boyfriend. Complaint, supra note 8, at 16. 
 72. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (“The net effect is that the dealership has allegedly discriminated 
against Tetro because of his race.”). 
 73. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 891–92 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). 
For a disparate treatment claim, “showing that discrimination was a ‘motivating’ or ‘substantial’ factor 
to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer” is sufficient; Congress does not require “but-for 
causality.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”); 
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 889 n.4 (2014). 
 74. See infra Part II.A.2.a–c. 
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ambiguity.75 Consequently, the court applied the “cardinal” canon of 
statutory construction: interpreting statutes “harmoniously with their 
dominant legislative purpose.”76 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, on 
its face, Title VII broadly protects “victims of discriminatory animus 
towards third persons with whom the individuals associate” and its 
purpose is consistent with the affiliative discrimination alleged by 
Tetro.77 
The Sixth Circuit’s determination that the lack of words like 
“directly” or “indirectly” renders “race” ambiguous means that “sex” 
is ambiguous because Title VII protected traits of “race” and “sex” 
are in the same sentence; thus, an inquiry into the legislative purpose 
is necessary.78 Before Title VII’s passage, and upon the amendment 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the inclusion of the term “sex,” it 
was argued that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently different from 
other types of discrimination and ought to receive separate legislative 
treatment.79 The defeat of this argument sends a clear message that 
legislators intended to treat “race” and “sex” in the same manner. 
Because the Sixth Circuit determined that Title VII’s legislative 
history supports a broad construction of “race,” to include Tetro’s 
claim based on the relationship between his race and the race of his 
daughter with whom he associates,80 one could reasonably argue that 
the legislative history supports a broad construction of “sex” to 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (citing Nixon v. Kent Cty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., 
dissenting)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 994 (“[C]ourts . . . have broadly construed Title VII to protect individuals who are the 
victims of discriminatory animus towards third persons with whom the individuals 
associate . . . . Similarly, we find that Tetro has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under 
Title VII.”) (citing Parr, 791 F.2d at 890; Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 680–81 (C.D. Cal.1991); 
and Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1366)). 
 78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . . 
Id.; see also Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995. 
 79. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84 
(1964)). 
 80. See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995. 
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include Vickers’s claims based on the relationship between his sex 
and the sex of people with whom he associates with. To interpret 
otherwise is not harmonious with Title VII’s dominant legislative 
purpose and violates the cardinal canon of construction. 
b. Applying “Noscitur a Sociis”—Defining a Word by the 
Company it Keeps 
When a statutory word is vague or ambiguous, courts may clarify 
its meaning and intent by referencing the surrounding words or 
phrases.81 Noscitur a sociis, or “it is known from its associates,” is a 
well-settled statutory canon: “a word may be defined by an 
accompanying word, and that, ordinarily, the coupling of words 
denotes an intention that they should be understood in the same 
general sense.”82 Because the Sixth Circuit has already identified and 
determined ambiguity exists within Title VII, it is proper to apply 
noscitur a sociis to ascertain the legislative meaning of the term 
“sex” in the statutory phrase, “because of such individual’s sex.”83 
“Race” and “sex” are words that appear, albeit not immediately, 
within the statute one after the other: “It shall be . . . unlawful . . . to 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”84 In accordance 
with noscitur a sociis, the coupling of “race,” “sex,” and other 
outlined categories denotes a legislative intent to understand these 
categories in the same general sense.85 In race discrimination cases 
like Tetro, courts understand the statutory relationship between 
“because of” and the enumerated word “race” to include a prohibition 
of discriminatory animus towards the race of third persons with 
                                                                                                                 
 81. NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47:16 (7th ed. 2007). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (citing Nixon v. Kent Cty, 76 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., 
dissenting)); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 81, § 47:16 (“The maxim noscitur a sociis is only a guide to 
legislative intent . . . and so, like any rule of construction, does not apply absent ambiguity . . . .”). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”). 
 85. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 81, § 47:16. 
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whom individuals associate.86 In sex discrimination cases like 
Vickers, the court must also embrace that proper statutory 
construction supports a relationship between “because of” and the 
enumerated word “sex” to include a prohibition of discriminatory 
animus towards the sex of third persons with whom individuals 
associate. This equal treatment of “race” and “sex” is also supported 
by the defeat of the argument among legislators in 1964 that “sex 
discrimination” was sufficiently different from other types of 
discrimination upon passing Title VII.87 Therefore, sex should be 
understood as encompassing affiliative discrimination along the same 
line of reasoning given to race.88 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995 (citing Nixon v. Kent Cty, 76 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., 
dissenting)); see also SINGER & SINGER, supra note 81, § 47:16. 
 87. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84 
(1964)). 
 88. Beyond applying affiliative discrimination theory to race, courts have also broadly interpreted 
“national origin” to embrace affiliative discrimination, consistently holding that Title VII protects an 
individual who is discriminated against because of his or her relationship with someone of a different 
national origin. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 211. In Chacon v. Ochs, a Caucasian woman brought action 
under Title VII alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because she was married 
to a Hispanic man. Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 680 (C.D. Cal. 1991). The EEOC defines 
Hispanic as “[a] person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish 
culture or origin regardless of race.” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OMB. NO. 3046-0007, 
INSTRUCTION BOOKLET: STANDARD FORM 100, EMPLOYER INFORMATION REPORT EEO-1 (2006), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/upload/instructions_form.pdf. Also, the EEOC maintains 
that “[n]ational origin discrimination involves treating people (applicants or employees) unfavorably 
because they are from a particular country or part of the world, because of ethnicity or accent, or 
because they appear to be of a certain ethnic background (even if they are not).” National Origin 
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/ 
nationalorigin.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). The court in Chacon noted that the different jurisdictions 
that have considered “whether Title VII violations include discriminatory employment practices based 
on an individual’s association with people of a different national origin” were divided on the issue. 
Chacon, 780 F. Supp. at 681. Ultimately, though, the court relied on the “irrefutable” logic in Whitney 
and held that the better-reasoned decisions recognize such a Title VII violation. Chacon, 780 F. Supp. at 
681; Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975). Although the court did not go through a statutory analysis using noscitur a sociis, it is evident 
that it seemed compelled to treat national origin as encompassing affiliative discrimination in a similar 
manner as the holding in Whitney treated race. Chacon, 780 F. Supp. at 681; Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 
1366. 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/6
2016] AFFILIATIVE DISCRIMINATION THEORY 559 
c. The EEOC Interprets Title VII to Prohibit Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination 
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit in Tetro supported its decision with 
guidance from the EEOC.89 The Tetro court noted that the EEOC, 
charged by Congress to interpret, administer, and enforce Title VII, 
has consistently held that “an employer who takes adverse action 
against an employee or a potential employee because of an interracial 
association violates Title VII.”90 The Supreme Court has also held 
that the EEOC’s administrative interpretation of Title VII is entitled 
to “great deference.”91 Although the EEOC adopted affiliative 
discrimination theory for race discrimination cases arising under Title 
VII at the time Tetro and Vickers were decided, the EEOC had not 
found Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination under 
Title VII’s purview of sex discrimination.92 A recent review of 
EEOC decisions, however, suggests that the Sixth Circuit should also 
adopt affiliative discrimination theory for sex discrimination cases, 
especially considering the Supreme Court’s instruction to give “great 
deference”93 to administrative interpretations of Title VII. 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994. 
 90. Id. (citing Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 91. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (finding good reason to treat the 
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress where the Commission’s construction is supported by the 
Act and legislative history); see Rosanna McCalips, Note, What Recent Court Cases Indicate About 
English-Only Rules in the Workplace: A Critical Look at the Need for A Supreme Court Ruling on the 
Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 417, 419–20 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012)). 
 92. Following the Tetro and Vickers decisions, “the [EEOC] . . . has made great strides . . . [toward] 
recognizing in non-binding decisions that discrimination based on sexual orientation falls under sex 
stereotyping and is therefore covered under Title VII.” Perkins, supra note 44, at 430 (citing Castello v. 
Donahoe, Appeal No. 0120111795, 2011 WL 6960810, at *3 (EEOC Dec. 20, 2011) (holding that 
Castello alleged a plausible sex stereotyping case which would entitle her to relief under Title VII after 
being subjecting to discriminatory remarks by her manager motivated by the sexual stereotype that 
having relationships with men is an essential part of being a woman and Castello’s failure to adhere to 
this stereotype); Veretto v. Donahoe, Appeal No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *3 (EEOC July 1, 
2011) (finding a plausible sex stereotyping case where a man alleged he was harassed because he 
intended to marry another man)). See also Hitchcock v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Appeal No. 
0120051461, 2007 WL 1393665 (EEOC May 3, 2007). Essentially, the EEOC maintains the view that 
“when lesbian, gay, and bisexual federal employees allege hostile work environments based on sex-
stereotyping, they may be entitled to relief under Title VII.” Verónica Caridad Rabelo & Lilia M. 
Cortina, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Gender Harassment and Heterosexist Harassment in LGBQ Work 
Lives, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 378, 386 (2014). 
 93. Tetro, 173 F3d. at 994 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434). 
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On July 15, 2015, in Complainant v. Anthony Foxx, the EEOC 
definitively held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
considered sex discrimination within Title VII’s statutory meaning 
and is a violation of the statute.94 Foxx involved a male air traffic 
controller’s allegation that his employer, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, refused to hire him for a permanent position as a 
Front Line Manager because he identifies as gay.95 During the 
selection process, the complainant claimed that his supervisor “made 
several negative comments about [c]omplainant’s sexual 
orientation,” like stating he did not “need to hear about that gay 
stuff” when complainant mentioned his partner, and that 
complainant’s male partner was “a distraction in the radar room.”96 
In reversing and remanding its previous decision, and dismissing 
the complaint on procedural grounds of timeliness, the EEOC on 
appeal found the claim was raised in a timely fashion and held an 
employee “alleging that an agency took his or her sexual orientation 
into account in an employment action necessarily alleges that the 
agency took his or her sex into account.”97 The agency reasoned: 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised 
on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, 
stereotypes, or norms. “Sexual orientation” as a concept cannot 
be defined or understood without reference to sex. A man is 
referred to as “gay” if he is physically and/or emotionally 
attracted to other men. A woman is referred to as “lesbian” if she 
is physically and/or emotionally attracted to other women. 
Someone is referred to as “heterosexual” or “straight” if he or 
she is physically and/or emotionally attracted to someone of the 
opposite-sex. It follows, then, that sexual orientation is 
inseparable from and inescapably linked to sex and, therefore, 
that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination involve sex-
                                                                                                                 
 94. Complainant v. Anthony Foxx, Sec’y, Dep’t of Transp. (Fed. Aviation Admin.), Appeal No. 
0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1 (EEOC July 15, 2015). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *2. 
 97. Id. at *5, *10. 
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based considerations.98 
Additionally, the EEOC directly addressed affiliative 
discrimination theory: “An employee alleging discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is alleging that his or her employer took 
his or her sex into account by treating him or her differently for 
associating with a person of the same sex.”99 The EEOC explained 
that its “analysis is not limited to the context of race discrimination,” 
and that Title VII “‘on its face treats each of the enumerated 
categories—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin —’ exactly 
the same.”100 As another finding, the court found that “sexual 
orientation discrimination also is sex discrimination because it 
necessarily involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes.”101 
Similarly, Vickers contended, “the facts alleged in [his] complaint 
establish[ed], as the district court found, that the discrimination 
Vickers experienced was motivated by Vickers’[s] perceived 
homosexuality . . . .”102 In alleging that his coworkers created a 
hostile work environment of adverse treatment toward him after 
taking his perceived sexual orientation103 into account, the district 
court and court of appeals should have concluded such action 
necessarily alleges his coworkers took his sex into account. 
Acknowledging that Vickers’s sex was taken into account amounts to 
discrimination because of his sex. 
Finally, Vickers also claimed his coworkers were motivated by the 
stereotype that men should not have close friendships with or 
mentorship from other men, and thus, coworkers treated Vickers 
adversely because he did not conform to male stereotypes.104 
Although Vickers never stated that he was homosexual, the 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at *5. 
 99. Id. at *6. 
 100. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 
(1989)). 
 101. Id. at *7. 
 102. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 103. “[I]ndividuals who are perceived as or who identify as homosexuals are not barred from bringing 
a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.” Id. at 762. 
 104. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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calculated sexual harassment based on Vickers’s perceived 
homosexuality sent a message to Vickers that he did not live up to his 
coworkers’ stereotype of a real man— “‘real’ men are attracted to 
women” and refrain from developing close relationships with other 
men.105 The EEOC interprets Title VII to cover this type of treatment 
as prohibited under the category of “sex” discrimination.106 
B. The Sixth Circuit Misapplied the Sex Stereotyping Theory & 
Gender Performance Rule in Vickers to Avoid Protecting Against 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Because the Sixth Circuit refused to adopt affiliative 
discrimination theory in Vickers by determining that Vickers’s claim 
was based on sexual orientation and not “sex,” the question arose 
whether homosexual sexual orientation was protected by sex-
stereotyping as gender non-conforming behavior.107 To decide, the 
Sixth Circuit adopted and applied Simonton’s gender performance 
rule—a rule not adopted by the Supreme Court—108 by requiring 
Vickers to present evidence of not conforming to gender in only 
appearance or behavior in the workplace.109 Then, the court solely 
focused on feminine non-conforming behavior, overlooking other 
ways in which Vickers, a male, exhibited observable non-gender 
conforming behavior at work.110 This allowed the court to conclude 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759 (“Vickers asserts that he has never discussed his sexuality with any of 
his coworkers.”); Todd Brower, Social Cognition “At Work”: Schema Theory and Lesbian and Gay 
Identity in Title VII, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 52 n.331 (2009). 
 106. See Brower, supra note 105, at 10 n.43. 
 107. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 761 (“As a result, Vickers argues, his claim is covered under the sex 
stereotyping theory of liability embraced by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins . . . .”). 
 108. The Sixth Circuit in Vickers mentions the “Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse focused 
principally on characteristics that were readily demonstrable in the workplace, such as the plaintiff’s 
manner of walking and talking at work, as well as her work attire and her hairstyle,” but then applies a 
“hard-and-fast” rule that requires the plaintiff to present only evidence of appearance or behavior 
observable in the workplace. Id. at 763. 
 109. See cases cited supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 110. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (focusing on cases where successful plaintiffs behaved or appeared only 
in a manner of the opposite sex and not in other non-gender conforming ways); see e.g., Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (female partner candidate described as “macho” and a 
“tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed” manager); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 
733 (6th Cir. 2005) (a male-to-female transsexual living as a male while on duty and living as a woman 
while off duty); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (a transsexual man that began 
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that Vickers’s complaint under sex stereotyping failed to state a 
claim.111 
A closer look at the facts of the case reveals that Vickers’s 
behavior was, in fact, nonconforming to his gender as a stereotypical 
male within the workplace. Vickers alleged that upon developing a 
close mentorship with a seventeen-year-old male employee who 
aspired to become a police officer, his coworkers made homophobic 
remarks and called the younger employee Vickers’s “boyfriend.”112 
While mentorship is not considered feminine behavior per se, 
Vickers’s coworkers clearly viewed men developing close 
relationships with other young men as non-masculine behavior that 
did not match their perceptions of how a man should act.113 The court 
directly acknowledged that Vickers’s coworkers considered these 
male relationships as him “questioning his masculinity.”114 Vickers 
further alleged he was harassed about his close friendship with a 
former roommate with whom he vacationed.115 This friendship 
incited coworkers to call him “fag” and increase the frequency and 
severity of their behavior.116 Once, Vickers used his former 
                                                                                                                 
“expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis”). 
 111. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763–64. 
Vickers has made no argument that his appearance or mannerisms on the job were 
perceived as gender non-conforming in some way and provided the basis for the 
harassment he experienced. Rather, the harassment of which Vickers complains is 
more properly viewed as harassment based on Vickers’[s] perceived 
homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity. 
Id. at 763. 
 112. Complaint, supra note 8, at 16 (stating that in August of 2002 Vickers befriended a seventeen-
year-old male employee, named Josh, who aspired to become a police officer and that coworkers 
referred to Josh as Vickers’s boyfriend). 
 113. See id. His coworker even referred to him as a “bitch,” a pejorative used to refer to feminine 
men. Id. at 37. See Michael J. Vargas, Title VII and the Trans-Inclusive Paradigm, 32 LAW & INEQ. 169, 
185 n.102 (2014) (“When applied to women it is easily recognizable as pejoratives such as ‘bitch,’ but 
the same language is often used to harass men as well, suggesting that all sexual harassment is primarily 
an attack on real or perceived feminine characteristics.”). 
 114. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759 (“Once his coworkers found out about the friendship, Vickers contends 
that Dixon and Mueller ‘began making sexually based slurs and discriminating remarks and comments 
about Vickers, alleging that Vickers was “gay” or homosexual, and questioning his masculinity.’”). 
 115. Complaint, supra note 8, at 15. 
 116. Id. at 18. Vickers also alleged that during an arrest, he discovered his coworkers had previously 
“double-locked” his handcuffs, requiring a key and two free hands to unlock. Id. at 17. “Double-locked” 
handcuffs placed Vickers in danger during the apprehension of the arrestee because Vickers had to 
temporarily take both of his hands off the arrestee. Id. 
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roommate’s cellphone to call the medical center and find out what 
time he had to report to work.117 His coworker responded to him 
calling from another man’s phone by ridiculing Vickers with 
homophobic slurs and sending harassing messages to his friend’s 
phone after the conversation.118 Moreover, Vickers’s mentor 
relationship and friendship with a male doctor began and existed at 
the medical center workplace, and his close relationship with his 
former roommate entered the workplace in an observable way (being 
harassed through his friend’s phone by coworkers on duty at 
work).119 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit was not persuaded that these 
behaviors were non-conforming to gender in an observable way at 
work.120 
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not require that 
plaintiffs only conform in observable ways, such as behavior or 
appearance, in the workplace or only in ways representative of the 
opposite gender to succeed on a sex discrimination claim under Title 
VII.121 The Court merely required that the plaintiffs not “match[] the 
stereotype associated with their group, for . . . ’Congress intended to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”122 The Court focused on the 
fact that the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was not feminine enough, 
and the Court held as sufficient any evidence that showed 
nonconformity with being a stereotypical female.123 Thus, the 
conclusion in Vickers that Price Waterhouse’s theory of sex 
stereotyping is not broad enough to encompass Vickers’s claim for 
discrimination because of sex is actually the result of a 
misapplication of the sex stereotyping theory and gender 
performance rule.124 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 18. 
 118. Id. at 18–19. 
 119. Id. at 15. 
 120. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 121. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251–52 (1989). 
 122. Id. at 251 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 123. Id. at 235. 
 124. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (“We conclude that the theory of sex stereotyping under Price 
Waterhouse is not broad enough . . . .”). 
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C. The Sixth Circuit’s Refusal to Adopt Affiliative Discrimination 
Theory for Sex Under Title VII Conflicts with Oncale’s Application of 
Title VII Protection Beyond Congressional Intent Against 
“Reasonably Comparable Evils” 
The Sixth Circuit held that Vickers’s sexual harassment from 
coworkers was a result of his perceived sexual orientation rather than 
his sex.125 The Sixth Circuit also reasoned that allowing Vickers’s 
claim would “bootstrap” sexual orientation into Title VII and 
improperly amend Title VII de facto to encompass sexual orientation 
against Congress’s intent.126 However, this logic does not comport 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Oncale of what should be 
included under Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of 
“sex.”127 
Oncale involved a male employee of an eight-man crew on an oil 
platform who alleged sexual harassment after being forcibly 
subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions by male coworkers, 
including name-calling suggesting he was homosexual.128 The 
Supreme Court stated that “male-on-male sexual harassment in the 
workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII”; however, “statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.”129 The Court held as actionable any kind of sexual 
harassment that met statutory requirements, stating Title VII broadly 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. (holding that because “the gender non-conforming behavior which Vickers claims supports 
his theory of sex stereotyping is not behavior observed at work or affecting his job performance, . . . the 
harassment of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as harassment based on Vickers’[s] 
perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity”). 
 126. Id. at 764–65. 
 127. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998) (“[S]tatutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately 
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.”). 
 128. Id. at 77 (stating coworkers “called him a name suggesting homosexuality”). Over a number of 
weeks, Oncale alleges being “sexually assaulted, battered, touched, and threatened with rape . . . .” Brief 
for Petitioner, supra note 23, at *4. 
 129. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
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prohibits “‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex’ in the ‘terms’ or 
‘conditions’ of employment.”130 
Although Oncale did not involve a male plaintiff affiliating in 
close, social relationships with other males in the workplace,131 it is 
significant to note that the Supreme Court extended Title VII 
protection to same-sex sexual harassment while acknowledging this 
was not the principal evil that Congress was concerned with 
prohibiting.132 Before Oncale, some courts, like the Fifth Circuit, 
held same-sex sexual harassment claims were never cognizable under 
Title VII because gender discrimination133 was the principal evil 
Congress intended to prohibit.134 This is essentially a congressional 
intent argument similar to the argument made by the Sixth Circuit in 
Vickers,135 which gauged congressional intent based on the fact that 
later congresses repeatedly rejected legislation136 that would have 
extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation.137 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 79–80. 
 131. Plaintiffs Vickers and Oncale alleged similar acts of sexual harassment although Oncale did not 
allege sex stereotyping. Compare Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at *4, with Complaint, supra note 
8, ¶¶ 10.I–J, 10.N. In his complaint, Vickers alleged being subjected to “unwanted offensive 
touching . . . while [a coworker] simulating performing anal sex on him,” approaches from behind and 
grabbing of his breast, and multiple touchings of his crotch and genital area. Complaint, supra note 8, 5–
7. 
 132. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
 133. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refers to “gender discrimination” as equal treatment of 
both men and women. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994), 
abrogated by Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. 
 134. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78–79 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s holding that same-sex sexual 
harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII); see also Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452 (“‘Title VII 
addresses gender discrimination.’ Thus, what [male Defendant] did to [male Plaintiff] could not in any 
event constitute sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII, and hence summary judgment in 
favor of all defendants was proper on this basis also.”) (citation omitted). 
 135. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Bibby v. Phila. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has 
no place in our society. Congress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such 
harassment.”)). 
 136. The Second Circuit noted that “congressional inaction subsequent to the enactment of a statute is 
not always a helpful guide,” but nevertheless considered this strong evidence of congressional intent. 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 137. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765. In the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Vickers, the court relied on the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. in stating Congress has yet to 
prohibit harassment based on perceived homosexual sexual orientation. Id. (citing Bibby, 260 F.3d at 
265). Bibby reached this conclusion not based on legislative history but the fact that Congress repeatedly 
rejected legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation. Bibby, 260 F.3d at 
261. 
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Thus, not only has the Sixth Circuit erroneously derived this 
congressional intent to exclude sexual orientation based on legislative 
inaction and not actual legislative history,138 but the Supreme Court 
has already held that Title VII’s protection reaches beyond 
Congressional intent.139 The Sixth Circuit’s rejection of affiliative 
discrimination theory for sex discrimination under Title VII conflicts 
with the broad interpretation the Supreme Court has applied in 
construing discrimination on the basis of sex in Oncale. 
The Supreme Court states that “the critical issue, Title VII’s text 
indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to 
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex are not exposed.”140 If Vickers had been 
female, certainly his coworkers would not have harassed him for 
building close relationships with male employees, especially 
considering the alleged harassment consisted of daily homophobic 
remarks.141 Vickers’s discrimination is inherently based on his sex, 
and the Supreme Court’s holding that Title VII broadly prohibits 
“‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex’ in the ‘terms’ or 
‘conditions’ of employment” mandates the Sixth Circuit find 
Vickers’s claim actionable as discrimination because of sex.142 
III. PROPOSAL 
The Sixth Circuit effectively avoided adopting affiliative 
discrimination theory for Title VII sex discrimination by not 
identifying the cause of the discrimination as sex, but rather as sexual 
orientation.143 However, this placed the cause within the ambit of sex 
stereotyping protection because the court, by its own admission, has 
                                                                                                                 
 138. The Supreme Court has held “[c]ongressional inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because 
‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction, ‘including the inference that the 
existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.’” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990). 
 139. See Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35; see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
 140. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring)). 
 141. See discussion supra Part II.A.1; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 142. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80. 
 143. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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recognized homosexuality is inherently gender non-conforming.144 
Thus, to avoid protecting sexual orientation under Title VII, the Sixth 
Circuit misapplied the sex stereotyping theory by creating two extra 
requirements: (1) that plaintiffs only conform in ways observable in 
the workplace (the gender performance rule), and (2) that plaintiffs 
non-conform in ways representative of only the opposite gender.145 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Vickers not only appears unguided 
by an accurate interpretation and application of Title VII, sex 
stereotyping theory, and Supreme Court jurisprudence, but by an 
impetus to not protect sexual orientation under Title VII.146 This Note 
proposes that the Sixth Circuit abandon precluding sexual orientation 
under Title VII by adopting affiliative discrimination theory for sex 
discrimination in order to resolve the aforementioned inconsistencies 
in interpretation and application; relieve courts from attempting the 
difficult task of distinguishing between discrimination because of sex 
and discrimination because of sexual orientation; and realize the 
benefits and increased protection to which citizens are statutorily 
entitled.147 
A. The Sixth Circuit Should Stop Pursuing the Unreasonable Idea of 
Precluding Sexual Orientation Under Title VII’s “Sex” Category 
The Sixth Circuit should recognize the unreasonableness of 
separating sexual orientation from protection under Price 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006). “[A]ny discrimination based 
on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to 
stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual 
practices.” Id. 
 145. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). The Supreme Court in Price 
Waterhouse did not impose the requirement that plaintiffs only conform in ways observable (behavior or 
appearance) in the workplace but only in ways representative of the opposite gender to succeed on a sex 
discrimination claim under Title VII. Id. 
 146. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763–66. The Sixth Circuit misinterpreted Title VII by creating an 
inaccurate congressional intent to exclude sexual orientation based on legislative inaction of later 
congresses and not actual legislative history. Id. at 765. The Sixth Circuit also misapplied sex 
stereotyping theory to exclude sexual orientation protection by creating extra evidentiary requirements 
for plaintiffs. See discussion supra Part II.B. Finally, the Sixth Circuit misapplied Supreme Court 
jurisprudence from Oncale that instructs federal courts to apply Title VII protection beyond 
congressional intent against “reasonably comparable evils” that meet statutory requirements. Oncale, 
523 U.S. at 79–80; Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765. 
 147. See infra Part III.A–B. 
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Waterhouse’s broad interpretation of Title VII discrimination 
“because of sex.” The Sixth Circuit, in its 2006 Vickers decision, 
states clearly why this is unreasonable: “all homosexuals, by 
definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual 
practices.”148 These sexual practices fail to conform because they 
occur between members of the same sex.149 
The Sixth Circuit in Vickers inquired about the cause of the 
discrimination just enough to find prejudice against homosexuality150 
as the “root animus” and not enough to find that the true “essence” of 
discrimination against homosexuals is their sex.151 Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “homosexual” as relating to or characterized by 
sexual desire for a person of the same sex.152 Creating a hostile work 
environment for a male employee because he is perceived as being 
attracted to another male takes into account and hinges on the fact 
that the employee is male, himself. Thus, the comparison of his sex 
to his associate’s sex is the essence of the discrimination. If he were 
female, the discrimination would not occur. The relevant inquiry 
should be whether an enumerated category pertaining to the 
employee is the essence of the discrimination. 
Put differently, it would seem highly unreasonable for the Sixth 
Circuit to state that a white employee discriminated against because 
he is married to a black woman has no recourse under Title VII 
because interracial marriage is not specifically listed as prohibited 
discrimination within the statute. While interracial marriage might be 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 764. 
 149. Id. at 763 n.2. In arguing for Title VII protection, Vickers alleged he was teased about fellatio 
and anal sex with males. Id. 
 150. Id. at 763 (“[T]he harassment of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as 
harassment based on Vickers’[s] perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-
conformity.”). 
 151.  Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994 
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding despite the root animus for the discrimination being a prejudice against the 
biracial child, the essence of the discrimination is the comparison in races between Tetro and his 
daughter because “[i]f [Tetro] had been African-American, presumably the dealership would not have 
discriminated”). Here, despite the root animus for the discrimination being a prejudice against 
homosexuality, the “essence” of the discrimination is the comparison of Vickers’s sex to his male 
mentee, the male doctor at the medical center, and his former male roommate. If Vickers had been 
female, presumably his coworkers would not have discriminated against him. See id. 
 152. Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 853 (10th ed. 2014). 
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the motivation for discrimination, the essence of the discrimination is 
the comparison of the employee’s race to his wife’s race. If one of 
them were a different race, no discrimination would occur. The same 
logic should apply when a male employee is discriminated against 
because he is perceived to have a romantic relationship with another 
man. While homosexuality might be the motivation for 
discrimination, the essence of the discrimination is the comparison of 
the employee’s sex to his perceived mate’s sex. If one of them were 
of a different sex, the discrimination would not occur. 
Yet, the Sixth Circuit takes an unreasonable approach in stating 
that there is no recourse under Title VII because sexual orientation is 
not specifically listed as prohibited discrimination within the statute. 
This argument is illogical and why the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence 
conflicts with Price Waterhouse.153 This notion is even more 
unreasonable considering the Sixth Circuit’s strongest argument, that 
their opinion is not based on actual legislative history but that later 
congresses have not amended the statute to specifically list “sexual 
orientation” as a protected category.154 Gauging the intent of recent 
Congresses, however, is an unreasonable method to gauge the intent 
of Congress when passing Title VII. The Supreme Court has held 
“[c]ongressional inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because 
‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such 
inaction, ‘including the inference that the existing legislation already 
incorporated the offered change.’”155 
 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (stating “an employer who acts on 
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender”). This leads to the inference that an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be attracted to other women, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. See id. 
 154. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). Congress similarly has not amended 
Title VII to include racial orientation (plaintiff’s attraction and marriage to a black woman in Parr v. 
Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co.), interracial friendship, or interracial affiliation, yet these 
have all been found by different courts to be protected under Title VII. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 
556 F.3d 502, 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2009); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1998); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 155. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)). 
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B. Citizens Will Benefit If the Sixth Circuit Adopts Affiliative 
Discrimination Theory for “Sex” Under Title VII 
1. Consistent Jurisprudence That Citizens Can Rely On 
The Sixth Circuit should adopt affiliative discrimination theory for 
sex discrimination under Title VII to ensure predictable and stable 
law, which would give citizens a greater sense of security and 
certainty when litigating claims under Title VII.156 If courts treated 
“race” and “sex” uniformly under Title VII, citizens would not have 
to gamble and guess about how the Court would rule in litigating sex 
discrimination.157 When the Sixth Circuit adopted affiliative 
discrimination for race under Title VII in Tetro, the principle of stare 
decisis—which aims to create predictability and preserve stability in 
the law—required adherence to the same rationale for “sex” under 
Title VII.158 
Beyond intra-circuit consistency, adopting this theory would create 
consistency between the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of 
discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII and the Supreme 
Court’s broad interpretation of the same.159 The Supreme Court’s 
Price Waterhouse decision instructs courts to provide relief when an 
employee is subjected to discrimination because they do not conform 
to sex stereotypes.160 Affiliative discrimination theory is in 
accordance with the Court’s policy because it permits relief when a 
male employee is subjected to discrimination because he does not 
conform to masculine stereotypes by building close relationships 
                                                                                                                 
 156. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194 (2006). 
The rule of stare decisis is founded largely on considerations of judicial efficiency 
and sound principles of public policy, to preserve the continuity, predictability 
and stability of the law . . . . The theory is that when a legal principle is accepted 
and established . . . security and certainty require that the principle be 
subsequently recognized and followed . . . . 
Id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id.; Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 
994 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 159. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 160. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (“[A]n employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”). 
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with other males in the workplace. The Supreme Court’s Oncale 
decision instructs federal courts to provide relief when members of 
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed, 
even when such discrimination is beyond the principal congressional 
intent of Title VII.161 Affiliative discrimination theory is also in 
accordance with the Court’s decision because the theory permits 
relief when a male employee is subjected to discrimination as a result 
of maintaining a social relationship with other males when he would 
not have received such treatment were he female. 
2. More Protection Without the Fear of Title VII Becoming a 
General Civility Code 
Adopting affiliative discrimination theory for sex discrimination 
under Title VII would also increase protection for citizens while not 
transforming the statute into a general civility code.162 A general 
civility code is a complete prohibition of “all verbal or physical 
harassment at the workplace.”163 The Supreme Court and the Sixth 
Circuit maintain that “Title VII is not a ‘general civility code’ for the 
workplace [and] it does not prohibit harassment in general.”164 The 
possible concern, if the Sixth Circuit adopts affiliative discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift 
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
 162. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will not transform 
Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace, since Title VII is directed at 
discrimination because of sex, “not merely [conduct] tinged with offensive sexual connotations . . . .” Id. 
at 81. Recognizing liability for same-sex harassment also will not transform Title VII into a general 
civility code for the American workplace because “the statute does not reach genuine but innocuous 
differences in the ways men and women routinely interact . . . [and] the objective severity of harassment 
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all 
the circumstances.” Id. 
 163. Elizabeth Monroe Shaffer, Comment, Defining the “Environment” in Title VII Hostile Work 
Environment Claims: Appellate Courts, Classism, and Sexual Harassment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 695, 700 
(2002). 
 164. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Spearman v. Ford Motor 
Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding male employee “who endured threatening and hostile 
statements, taunting, and graffiti did not establish hostile work environment claim because his 
coworkers ‘maligned him because of his apparent homosexuality, and not because of his sex’”)). See 
Shaffer, supra note 163, at 700 (“The [Supreme] Court further explained that Title VII is not a ‘general 
civility code’ for the American workplace . . . .”). 
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theory for sex discrimination cases, is that Title VII would morph 
overnight into a general civility code for the American workforce is 
unfounded for the same reasons enunciated by the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Oncale that same-sex sexual harassment was actionable 
under Title VII: the statute is “directed at discrimination because of 
sex, not merely conduct tinged with offensive sexual 
connotations.”165 The Court also pointed out that Title VII “does not 
reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women 
routinely interact” and that there is an additional hurdle to clear in 
that “the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, 
considering all the circumstances.”166 
Permitting individuals to sue for discrimination because of sex 
under affiliative discrimination theory can only happen after the 
aforementioned hurdles are cleared as well. The plaintiff must still 
show that the discrimination was because of his sex by alleging facts 
on par with a male plaintiff being treated adversely as a result of his 
close affiliation with another male.167 Additionally, the Court 
continues to charge the plaintiff with alleging severity beyond simple 
teasing or roughhousing and conduct which a reasonable person in 
the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.168 The 
Sixth Circuit found the specific harassment alleged by Vickers 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (finding no justification in Title VII’s language or the Court’s precedents 
for a categorical rule barring a claim of discrimination “because of . . . sex” merely because the plaintiff 
and the defendant were of the same sex). 
 166. Id. at 81. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. at 81–82. The Supreme Court elaborates further on what constitutes severely or pervasively 
abusive: 
In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful 
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is 
experienced by its target. A professional football player’s working environment is 
not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the 
buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably 
be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the 
office. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a 
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which 
are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts 
performed. 
Id. 
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“unacceptable and repugnant,” the Second Circuit found a case of 
similarly alleged conduct “appalling persecution,” and the Third 
Circuit regards harassment on the basis of sexual orientation in 
general to be conduct that “has no place in our society.” 169 These 
hurdles not only prevent Title VII’s conversion into a general civility 
code, but also prevents a flood of litigation in federal courts. 
3. Entitlement to Partial Protection Where Congress Has Failed to 
Act 
Another benefit of adopting affiliative discrimination theory for 
sex under Title VII is affording certain real or perceived homosexual 
plaintiffs at least partial protection to which they are statutorily 
entitled.170 While this Note advocates that sexual orientation 
discrimination is, indeed, discrimination because of sex under Title 
VII,171 it should be acknowledged that adopting affiliative 
discrimination theory for sex under Title VII is not comprehensive 
protection for discrimination based on sexual orientation. At the heart 
of this theory is the idea that an employee is discriminated against 
based on sex when the employee affiliates with someone of the same 
sex;172 no protection exists for employees targeted with 
discrimination simply because the individual is perceived as or 
identifies as homosexual in the workplace. Therefore, establishing a 
claim would also require establishing an affiliation or relationship of 
some type with someone of the same sex.173 This form of under-
protection is why Congress must continue its attempt to pass an 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act that includes sexual 
orientation, as it has attempted many times in the past.174 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765; Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 
2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 170. As previously discussed, real or perceived homosexual plaintiffs discriminated against based on 
their affiliation with persons of the same sex are statutorily entitled to protection under Title VII because 
jurisprudence and statutory construction support application of affiliative discrimination theory similar 
to race claims. See discussion supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 171. See supra Part III.A. 
 172. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35 (citing Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th 
Cong. (1996); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); and 
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The most recent attempt to pass such legislation was a sexual 
orientation inclusive version of the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act that looked promising after passing the U.S. Senate on November 
7, 2013, but the bill never passed in the House.175 Until there is 
legislative action to amend workplace protections to include sexual 
orientation discrimination, circuit court adoption of affiliative 
discrimination theory for sex discrimination under Title VII provides 
at least some statutory protection for homosexual plaintiffs facing, in 
the words of the Sixth Circuit, “unacceptable” and “repugnant” 
treatment in the workplace.176 
CONCLUSION 
On the heels of the 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,177 it is incumbent to reflect on the broad spectrum of injustice 
that Title VII was meant to prohibit. Justice Scalia phrased it best 
when, delivering for the unanimous opinion in Oncale, he stated that 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our 
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed.”178 Title VII does not prohibit some discrimination 
because of sex but “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment.”179 
Adopting affiliative discrimination theory is an important step in 
the right direction for the Sixth Circuit in ending the unreasonable 
                                                                                                                 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994)); Ulane v. E. Airlines, 
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting Congress has rejected a number of proposed 
amendments to Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation)); Rabelo & Cortina, 
supra note 92, at 386. 
 175. Rabelo & Cortina, supra note 92, at 386; Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 
113th Cong. (2013). 
 176. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating “the harassment 
alleged by Vickers reflects conduct that is socially unacceptable and repugnant to workplace standards 
of proper treatment and civility”). See also Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society.”); Simonton, 
232 F.3d at 35 (“[Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation] is morally reprehensible whenever and 
in whatever context it occurs, particularly in the modern workplace.”). 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 178. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 179. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (citing L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
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notion that real or perceived homosexual sexual orientation is not 
within the ambit of protection under Price Waterhouse’s broad 
interpretation of Title VII sex discrimination. 180 This step would also 
give citizens a greater sense of security and certainty when litigating 
claims under Title VII without the fear of transforming the statute 
into a general civility code.181 Finally, in the absence of Congress 
amending Title VII to include sexual orientation, this step would 
provide some statutory protection to which some citizens of 
homosexual sexual orientation are entitled.182 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See supra Part III.A. 
 181. See supra Part III.B.1–2. 
 182. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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